As of 30 September 2026.

The German Basic Law contains provisions on the relationship between domestic and international law and a constitutional prohibition of acts disturbing the peaceful coexistence of peoples. § 80a of the Criminal Code penalises incitement to the crime of aggression. In March 2021 the Federal Government published a position paper setting out how it considers international law to apply to State conduct in cyberspace. These texts are referred to in debates on the domestic implementation of the peace mandate of the Basic Law and on State positions regarding cyber and information operations.

• Art. 24 GG – The Federation may transfer sovereign powers to international organisations (para. 1) and, to maintain peace, may enter a system of mutual collective security, consenting to limitations of its sovereign powers (para. 2); para. 3 concerns international arbitration.
• Art. 25 GG – “Die allgemeinen Regeln des Völkerrechtes sind Bestandteil des Bundesrechtes. Sie gehen den Gesetzen vor und erzeugen Rechte und Pflichten unmittelbar für die Bewohner des Bundesgebietes.” (General rules of international law form part of federal law, take precedence over statutes and directly create rights and duties.)
• Art. 26(1) GG – Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, are unconstitutional and shall be made a criminal offence.
• § 80a StGB – Penalises publicly inciting, in a meeting or by disseminating content, to the crime of aggression (§ 13 Code of Crimes against International Law, VStGB) within the territorial scope of the StGB, with imprisonment of three months to five years.

The 2021 position paper sets out, among others, the following views of the Federal Government:

• Sovereignty is treated as a legal norm applicable in cyberspace; cyber operations attributable to a State that cause physical effects and harm, or substantial functional impairments, in another State's territory are considered to violate it.
• Non-intervention: a prohibited intervention requires interference in the domaine réservé and coercion. The paper states that malicious cyber activities targeting elections, including large-scale disinformation campaigns or disabling election infrastructure, may constitute a prohibited intervention, “in particular if this compromises or even prevents the holding of an election”.
• Use of force and armed attack: cyber operations may amount to a use of force where their scale and effects are comparable to a traditional kinetic use of force; an armed attack may give rise to the right of self-defence under Art. 51 UN Charter.
• Due diligence: the paper refers to an obligation of States not to knowingly allow their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.
• Attribution, countermeasures, IHL and human rights: the paper addresses attribution under the rules of State responsibility, proportionate countermeasures respecting fundamental human rights obligations, and the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber operations in armed conflict.

Germany has also submitted its views to UN processes on ICTs (see ict_norms).

No recent developments recorded.

• charter
• friendly_relations
• ict_norms
• rome_statute
• icj_nicaragua
• nis2_cer
• cyber_sanctions
• tallinn_manual

• Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (gesetze-im-internet.de), accessed 2026-09-27
• Basic Law, official English translation (gesetze-im-internet.de), accessed 2026-09-27
• § 80a StGB (gesetze-im-internet.de), accessed 2026-09-27
• Federal Government: On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace (March 2021), accessed 2026-09-27
• Same position paper (UNODA repository), accessed 2026-09-27

• 2026-09-27: Entry created (draft).
• 2026-09-30: Entry reviewed and finalised.