As of 30 September 2026. Information only, not legal advice – see the disclaimer.
| Full title | Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) |
|---|---|
| Type | Judgment (International Court of Justice) |
| Adopted by | International Court of Justice |
| Adopted | Merits judgment: 27 June 1986 (ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14); judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility: 26 November 1984 |
| Legal status | Binding on the parties to the case (Art. 59 ICJ Statute); case removed from the List on 26 September 1991 following discontinuance by Nicaragua |
| Official text | ICJ – Case 70 |
| Subject area | Use of force, intervention and cyber operations |
Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the United States on 9 April 1984 concerning military and paramilitary activities, including support for the contras, the laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters and attacks on ports and oil installations. In its 1986 merits judgment the Court applied customary international law, as the United States' multilateral treaty reservation prevented it from applying the UN Charter as such. The Court found that the United States had breached customary obligations not to intervene in the affairs of another State, not to use force against another State and not to violate its sovereignty. The judgment's statements on the prohibition of intervention, the use of force, armed attack, self-defence and attribution of conduct of non-State groups are referred to in debates on how international law applies to cyber and information operations. The United States did not participate in the merits phase after January 1985.
The “scale and effects” formula (para. 195) and the description of prohibited intervention as coercive interference in matters within a State's domaine réservé (para. 205) are referred to in national positions on the application of international law in cyberspace and in expert works such as the Tallinn Manual 2.0 (tallinn_manual). States differ on how the coercion element applies to cyber operations and to influence or disinformation campaigns, for example in relation to electoral processes (see friendly_relations, ict_norms, germany). The “effective control” standard (para. 115) is referred to in discussions on attributing to States the cyber operations of non-State actors. The Court's finding on the psychological operations manual is referred to in discussions on State responsibility for information activities that encourage violations of international humanitarian law.
No recent developments recorded.