As of 1 October 2026. Information only, not legal advice – see the disclaimer.
| Full title | No specific instrument protecting nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) against cyber operations |
|---|---|
| Type | Regulatory gap |
| Adopted by | – |
| Adopted | – |
| Legal status | No treaty, political commitment or other instrument specifically addresses cyber operations against nuclear command, control and communications systems |
| Official text | – |
| Subject area | Regulatory gaps; Use of force, intervention and cyber operations |
Nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) systems comprise the infrastructure used to plan, warn of, authorise and execute the use of nuclear weapons, including early-warning, communication and decision-support systems. There is no international instrument that specifically regulates cyber operations directed at, or affecting, such systems; commentators note that no existing treaty refers to NC3 as such. General rules of international law – including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law and the voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs – apply according to their terms. Governments, research institutes and experts have described risks that cyber operations affecting NC3 could lead to misperception, escalation or unauthorised use, and have put forward proposals ranging from dialogue and national measures to norms of restraint and a code of conduct.
Nearby instruments and commitments (none specific to NC3):
Proposals and analyses (selection, chronological):
Intergovernmental processes. The Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 27 April – 22 May 2026) ended without a consensus outcome document. No negotiating process on an NC3-specific instrument is under way.