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gaps:nc3 [2026/09/27 18:18] – Entry created (draft) lfpogaps:nc3 [2026/10/01 14:09] (current) – Disclaimer reference added lfpo
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-====== No specific instrument protecting nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) against cyber operations ======+====== Gap: protection of nuclear command, control and communications ======
  
-//Draft – editorial review pending. As of 27 September 2026.//+//As of 1 October 2026. Information only, not legal advice – see the [[about:disclaimer|disclaimer]].//
  
 +^ Full title | No specific instrument protecting nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) against cyber operations |
 ^ Type | Regulatory gap | ^ Type | Regulatory gap |
 ^ Adopted by | – | ^ Adopted by | – |
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 ^ Legal status | No treaty, political commitment or other instrument specifically addresses cyber operations against nuclear command, control and communications systems | ^ Legal status | No treaty, political commitment or other instrument specifically addresses cyber operations against nuclear command, control and communications systems |
 ^ Official text | – | ^ Official text | – |
-^ Matrix position | syntactic · international order |+^ Subject area | Regulatory gaps; Use of force, intervention and cyber operations |
  
 ===== Overview ===== ===== Overview =====
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   * **P5 Joint Statement of 3 January 2022** – the leaders of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States affirmed that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and stated that each would maintain and further strengthen national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. The statement does not refer to cyber operations.   * **P5 Joint Statement of 3 January 2022** – the leaders of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States affirmed that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and stated that each would maintain and further strengthen national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. The statement does not refer to cyber operations.
   * **United States–China, 16 November 2024** – at a meeting in Lima, the two presidents "affirmed the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons" (White House readout as reported). The statement does not refer to cyber operations.   * **United States–China, 16 November 2024** – at a meeting in Lima, the two presidents "affirmed the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons" (White House readout as reported). The statement does not refer to cyber operations.
 +  * **UN General Assembly resolution 80/23** (1 December 2025; 118 in favour, 9 against, 44 abstentions) – "Possible risks of the integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons". The resolution concerns artificial intelligence in nuclear command, control and communications; it does not specifically address cyber operations ([[law:un:military_ai]]).
  
 ===== Application to cyber and information operations ===== ===== Application to cyber and information operations =====
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 ===== Recent developments ===== ===== Recent developments =====
   * 2024-11-16: United States–China leaders' statement on maintaining human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons (as reported).   * 2024-11-16: United States–China leaders' statement on maintaining human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons (as reported).
 +  * 2025-12-01: UN General Assembly adopts resolution 80/23 on possible risks of the integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command, control and communications systems (UN Digital Library).
   * 2026-03-16: Nautilus Institute publishes proposal for an NC3 code of conduct (E. Crawford).   * 2026-03-16: Nautilus Institute publishes proposal for an NC3 code of conduct (E. Crawford).
   * 2026-05-22: NPT Review Conference ends without a consensus outcome (UN press release DC/3912).   * 2026-05-22: NPT Review Conference ends without a consensus outcome (UN press release DC/3912).
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   * [[law:un:laws]]   * [[law:un:laws]]
   * [[gaps:laws_treaty]]   * [[gaps:laws_treaty]]
 +  * [[law:un:military_ai]]
 +  * [[law:statements:magnifica_humanitas]]
  
 ===== Sources ===== ===== Sources =====
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   * [[https://press.un.org/en/2026/dc3912.doc.htm|UN, Review Conference Ends without Consensus Outcome amid Rising Nuclear Risks (DC/3912)]], accessed 2026-09-27   * [[https://press.un.org/en/2026/dc3912.doc.htm|UN, Review Conference Ends without Consensus Outcome amid Rising Nuclear Risks (DC/3912)]], accessed 2026-09-27
   * [[https://www.un.org/en/conferences/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-npt-2026|United Nations, 2026 NPT Review Conference]], accessed 2026-09-27   * [[https://www.un.org/en/conferences/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-npt-2026|United Nations, 2026 NPT Review Conference]], accessed 2026-09-27
 +  * [[https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4094665|UN Digital Library, A/RES/80/23 Possible risks of the integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons (voting record)]], accessed 2026-10-01
  
 ===== Change log ===== ===== Change log =====
   * 2026-09-27: Entry created (draft).   * 2026-09-27: Entry created (draft).
 +  * 2026-09-30: Entry reviewed and finalised.
 +  * 2026-10-01: GA resolution 80/23 added.
  
gaps/nc3.1790533123.txt.gz · Last modified: by lfpo